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ABSTRACT
Local rules have been unfairly cast as procedural villains. Their
qualifications for the role are purportedly numerous, but chief among
them is that they violate a fundamental principle embedded in our
post-1938 procedural regime: procedural rules applied in a federal
case should not be sensitive to location. It must, of course, be con-
ceded that local rules do produce territorial variations in procedure.
But in practice, the principle of trans-territoriality is aspirational,
and is undermined by an array of factors—ranging from competing
interpretations of written rules to the supplementation of those rules
through exercises of inherent power—that inevitably contribute to
location-based variations in the actual procedural requirements
imposed in federal cases. Properly situated, local rules are not an
outlier, but are merely one form of territorial variation among many.
To assess local rules, therefore, we should not ask whether they
produce territorial variation, but whether a procedural regime that
permits them produces a better mix of territorial variation than one
that does not. When viewed this way, local rules emerge as
attractive—if not quite heroic—because they are transparent, they
reflect participation by nonjudicial actors, and they promote
intradistrict equality in the treatment of cases.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 13, 2010, the United States Supreme Court stayed
the live broadcast of a federal trial to decide the constitutionality of
California’s Proposition 8.1 In doing so, the Court took pains to avoid
any discussion of the underlying merits of the case or the general
question of whether federal trials should be broadcast.2 Instead, the
Court justified the stay on fairly technical grounds: the local rule
used to support the broadcast order was invalid because it had been
improperly amended.3 This ruling marked only the fourth time since
the introduction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 that
the Supreme Court has addressed local rules and local rulemaking
authority.4 Although much of the per curiam majority opinion
focused on the details surrounding the promulgation of the particu-
1. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705 (2010) (per curiam). It would perhaps be more
accurate to say that the trial at issue in Hollingsworth promised to temporarily decide the
constitutionality of Proposition 8. From the outset, trial participants expected an appeal and
were explicitly structuring the case for eventual Supreme Court review. See Margaret Talbot,
A Risky Proposal, NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010, at 40, 40-41, 45-47 (describing the litigation
strategy and the likelihood of eventual Supreme Court review); William C. Duncan, The
Proposition 8 Trial: Understanding the Evidence, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 3, 2010,
http://spectator.org/archives/2010/03/03/the-proposition-8-trial-unders (arguing that the
decision to seek—and permit—broadcast was “probably driven by the ultimate goal of the
case—a hearing before the U.S. Supreme Court”). On August 4, 2010, United States District
Judge Vaughn Walker issued a decision declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutional. Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). That decision was subsequently stayed
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and oral argument for the appeal is currently set for
December 2010. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16,
2010).
2. Hollingsworth, 130 S. Ct. at 709 (“We do not here express any views on the propriety
of broadcasting court proceedings generally.”).
3. Id. at 714-15. Because the issue was decided in the context of an application for a stay,
the Court’s opinion formally concluded that the amendment “likely did not” comply with
federal law. Id. at 709. But the remaining language of the opinion is not similarly restrained.
See, e.g., id. at 713 (“The District Court here attempted to revise its rules in haste, contrary
to federal statutes and the policy of the Judicial Conference of the United States.”); id. at 715
(“If courts are to require that others follow regular procedures, courts must do so as well.”).
4. The three other cases are Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); Wingo v. Wedding, 418
U.S. 461 (1974); and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973). As Justice Breyer argued in his
dissent in Hollingsworth, the paucity of Supreme Court cases involving local rules may be due
to an appropriate deference to the Circuit Judicial Councils in monitoring and policing local
judicial administration. Hollingsworth, 130 S. Ct. at 717-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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lar rule at issue,5 the opinion also bemoaned the “lack of a regular
rule with proper standards.”6 This latter concern is unrelated to the
procedures used to sustain the amendment, but is directed instead
at local rules themselves. 
Thus, the case may reflect some unease with the status of local
rules in the federal system. If so, the Supreme Court is late to the
party. Hostility toward local rules is as old as the Federal Rules
themselves. Over the past seventy years, a steady stream of com-
mentators and committees has recommended that the role of local
rules in the federal procedural structure be reduced or eliminated.7
The core complaint motivating these recommendations is that local
rules promote procedural disuniformity. As Part I explains, the
adoption of a federal system of procedural rules reflected an em-
brace of two forms of procedural uniformity: trans-substantivity and
trans-territoriality.8 Trans-substantive procedure requires the
application of the same procedural rules regardless of substantive
law; trans-territorial procedure requires the application of the same
procedural rules regardless of geography. Local rules may create
tension with the norm of trans-substantivity if they are used to
impose different procedural requirements for different types of
cases.9 But as discussed in Part II, the larger problem with local
5. Specifically, the primary emphasis is on a rather convoluted timeline of amendments
and proposed amendments, Hollingsworth, 130 S. Ct. at 708 (per curiam), and on whether the
notice and comment period associated with those amendments satisfied statutory
requirements, id. at 710-11 (concluding no); but see id. at 715-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(concluding yes).
6. Id. at 713 (per curiam). 
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. A brief note about nomenclature is in order: the use of the label “trans-substantivity”
to describe the idea that the same federal rules should apply regardless of the nature of the
suit is well-accepted, and may be traced to Robert Cover. See generally Robert M. Cover, For
James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975). But
no similarly accepted phrase describes the parallel idea that the same federal rules should
apply regardless of the location of the suit. William Rubenstein has referred to this idea as
“trans-venue” uniformity. William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1885 n.75 (2002). I choose trans-territoriality instead, in part to
avoid any unnecessary confusion with the concept of venue, but primarily because it more
closely resembles trans-substantivity in form.
9. Then again, local rules of this sort potentially would be invalid. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 83(a) requires local rules to be consistent with federal rules, see infra Part II.A,
and the norm of trans-substantivity derives at least in spirit from Rule 1, which dictates that
the rules apply to “all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.” FED.
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rules is that they are almost unavoidably in tension with the norm
of trans-territoriality. Local rules create variations in procedural
requirements precisely on the basis of geography, and for that
reason, they have long been viewed as fundamentally inconsistent
with the Federal Rules project.
To this point, the defense of local rules has been sporadic and
largely uninspired. One recurring argument is that some rule-
making authority is necessary to deal with issues that are in-
escapably local.10 At its best, this narrow argument stops well
short of defending the current scope of local rulemaking power.
Defenders of local rules have also argued that critics improperly
undervalue the benefits of disuniformity in general and local rules
in particular. Examples of the unappreciated benefits cited include
the potential for local rules to act as “experiments” leading to
broader procedural reform,11 lower barriers to local procedural
R. CIV. P. 1; see also Cover, supra note 8, at 732-33 (explaining that the trans-substantivity
of the Federal Rules is in part based on the idea that one set of procedures can cover all
cases).
10. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the 1993
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Can Systemic Ills Afflicting the Federal
Courts Be Remedied by Local Rules?, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 721, 731 (1993) (“By and large, the
rules governing these matters turn on local custom. Because the need for nationwide
uniformity is low, perhaps even non-existent, local rules adequately serve their gap-filling
function.”); Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity,
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 861-62 (1989) (“[I]t is bad to have nationally uniform rules that sweep
so broadly in precluding local variation that they outlaw sensible adaptations to the kinds of
problems that are more common in the mix of cases on a particular local docket than in the
national mix.”); Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of
Local Rules in the Federal Courts, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 35-38 (1997) (identifying various
rules in the appellate context that are matters of local concern and that should be subject to
regulation by local circuit rules); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State
Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999,
2047 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Federal Rules] (“[Critics] argue that local rules permit
adjustment to local conditions.”); Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-
First Century, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533, 569 (2002) [hereinafter Tobias, Local Federal Civil
Procedure] (noting that many local rules were passed to address “peculiar, problematic local
conditions, which the federal rules frequently ignored”).
11. See Steven Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation,
or Information?, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 219 (1981) (“Local rules ... alert rulemakers to the
need for changes in national rules and provide an empirical basis for making changes.”);
Keeton, supra note 10, at 859 (noting that “the very purpose of a national rule” may be “to
generate and legitimize local experimentation”); Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2017
(discussing the Knox Committee’s predictions that local rules would have great
experimentation value because they would likely prove helpful in suggesting future
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change,12 and assistance with vital court administrative functions.13
Once these countervailing benefits are properly appreciated, they
may in some instances justify the cost of deviating from the ideal of
nationally uniform procedure.14 These arguments are useful because
the identified benefits are real, but they remain susceptible to the
response that the competing costs are too great. 
This Article develops a more robust defense of local rules, one
that is rooted in an acknowledgement that deviations from the norm
of trans-territoriality are unavoidable and unrelated to the choice
to permit local rules. Trans-territoriality has achieved a status as
a fundamental procedural value, but Part III demonstrates that this
value is largely aspirational in practice. The actual procedural
requirements imposed on litigants are inevitably sensitive to the
location of the suit—and the identity of the judge.15 The sources of
territorial variation include not just local rules, but also standing
amendments to the Federal Rules); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at
569 (describing the use of local rules as a means of experimenting with “innovative procedures
for resolving litigation, especially mechanisms that promised to foster economical, prompt
dispute disposition”).
12. See A SELF-STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL RULEMAKING: A REPORT FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING TO THE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE,
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 168 F.R.D.
679, 707-08 (1995) (describing recent changes that have resulted in slower reform of the
Federal Rules, including the increased opportunities for comment, increased length of report-
and-wait periods, and the frenetic process resulting from the allowance of multiple proposed
rule changes pending simultaneously). “It takes too long to amend a rule or create a new one,
and delay not only perpetuates whatever problem occasioned the call for amendment but also
invites Congress and local courts to step in.” Id. at 708.
13. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mary P. Squiers & Stephen N. Subrin, The Role of Local
Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62, 64-65 (1989) (observing that local rules can “rid the court of certain
routine tasks” and can assist “busy trial judges” by providing them with more specificity on
how to handle daily problems for which there is not a federal rule on point); Flanders, supra
note 11, at 263, 268 (discussing the “vital role” of local rules in assisting local “courts’ efforts
to manage themselves and their dockets” and describing local rules as a “powerful tool for
rationalizing diverse court practices and imposing uniformity”); Subrin, Federal Rules, supra
note 10, at 2017-19 (discussing how local rules can help the court manage routine tasks).
14. A related—but essentially unused—defense of local rules is that the value of
territorial uniformity is itself overvalued. Amanda Frost has recently made this argument in
the context of federal substantive law, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008),
and the argument applies equally well, if not better, to federal procedural law.
15. See infra Part III.
2010] TRANS-TERRITORIAL PROCEDURE 421
orders,16 procedural interpretation,17 procedural discretion,18 inher-
ent authority,19 and procedural common law.20 Moreover, these
forms of territorial variation often substitute for one another, such
that the presence of a local rule may displace the use of some
competing form.21
Thus, the debate about local rules needs to be resituated within
the larger universe of territorial variation. Part IV begins that
process. The choice to permit local rules is not a choice to permit
territorial variation, but a choice to permit territorial variation of a
certain form. And the question of whether to retain local rules, and
in what capacity, turns on how local rules interact with and
compare to other forms of territorial variation. Relative to those
other forms, local rules emerge as preferable along several dimen-
sions. They are transparent in the sense that they are visible, easily
discoverable, and knowable in advance. They are participatory in
the sense that nonjudicial actors are guaranteed a role in their
creation. And they are stabilizing in the sense that they make the
actual—as opposed to the formal—procedural requirements imposed
within a judicial district more consistent. 
I. TRANS-TERRITORIALITY AS A PROCEDURAL VALUE
Trans-territoriality, which involves the application of the same
procedural rules regardless of the geographic location of the suit,
was one of the guiding values in the creation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.22 Now, some seventy years after that creation, this
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part III.C.
19. See infra Part III.D.
20. See infra Part III.E.
21. See infra Part III.
22. It certainly was not the only guiding value. See Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access:
Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (2009)
(stating that “access”—meaning the expulsion of procedural barriers from “the opportunity
to reach the merits” of a case—was an explicit target of the rulemakers); Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law] (discussing how the rulemakers created equity-based Federal Rules to permit
“the participation of virtually unlimited numbers of people in trials” and “escape the
confinement of the common law”).
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value is firmly entrenched and rarely questioned. Civil procedure
students learn very early that the primary source to be studied is
the body of procedural rules that applies in every federal court, but
that state procedural rules may—and often do—vary. The idea that
procedure tracks the level of the court rather than its location is
accepted, and indeed seems obvious. But it is worth remembering
that trans-territoriality was once an innovation, and a contested
one.23 Part I defines trans-territoriality, and describes why it was—
and continues to be—perceived as valuable.
A. From Conformity to Uniformity
The introduction of the Federal Rules marked a departure from
the prevailing stance of conformity with state procedural rules to a
compelling stance of uniformity across all federal districts. The
conformity regime was governed by the Conformity Act of 1872,24
although cruder forms of conformity had been in place since 1789.25
An interesting and important connection exists between the procedural value of trans-
territoriality and the doctrine associated with Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), which instructs federal courts sitting in diversity to apply federal procedural laws.
This rule was also designed in part to promote federal uniformity—and to discourage
variations created by the need to follow local rules. See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963) (“One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules
is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules.”);
Rubenstein, supra note 8, at 1888. Indeed, the reason cited by the Supreme Court for granting
review in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965), was a “threat to the goal of uniformity
of federal procedure.” Thus, the allure of uniform federal procedure has generated hostility
over time toward local variations of any kind, whether the result of federally created local
rules or an obligation to enforce state-created procedural rules. 
23. The account presented here is brief and somewhat stylized. For a more thorough
history of events leading up to the passage of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077
(2006), see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015 (1982); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 22.
24. Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
25. See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1037. This cruder form required federal courts to use
the “forms of writs, executions and other process” that were the “same as now used in ...
[state] courts respectively in pursuance of the [original Conformity Act of 1789].” Act of May
8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. Unfortunately, that language was interpreted to define
the applicable federal procedure as the state procedure that existed in 1789, with the result
that subsequent modifications to state procedural rules were simply ignored. See Wayman v.
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825). Stephen Burbank has referred to this 1792 version
of conformity as “static,” and the 1872 version that replaced it as “dynamic.” Burbank, supra
note 23, at 1037-40.
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Under the Conformity Act, federal courts were required, subject to
caveats,26 to apply the “practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of
proceeding” of the states where they sat.27 This predictably resulted
in a balkanized set of federal procedural rules that broke down
along state lines, and therefore generated what at first blush looks
like the exact opposite of uniformity.28 But in fact, the conformity
regime was designed to promote rather than destroy uniformity,
although the particular uniformity envisioned was intrastate rather
than interdistrict.29 That is, conformity had as its goal the creation
of a single set of procedural rules that would apply within a given
state, regardless of whether a given case was filed in federal or state
court.30 
One problem with the conformity regime was that it did not serve
its vision of uniformity particularly well. In part this failure was
due to incomplete coverage. The Act applied only in the common law
context; federal equity cases were governed by a different set of
procedures—defined by federal common law and the Supreme Court
by way of its supervisory power—than state equity cases.31 In ad-
dition, the failure was due to the less-than-ironclad requirements
within the scope of coverage. The Act required only that federal
courts approximate state procedures “as near as may be” and in
“like causes,”32 which left sufficient wiggle room for courts to deviate
26. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
27. Conformity Act § 5. As with the earlier forms of the conformity acts, equity and
admiralty cases were excluded. 
28. Indeed, in some respects, the Conformity Act regime was even worse because it also
created balkanization between procedure in federal common law cases, which were governed
by the Conformity Act, and procedure in federal equity and admiralty cases, which were
governed by the Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority.
29. See Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875) (explaining that the purpose of the
Conformity Act was “to bring about uniformity in the law of procedure in the Federal and
State courts of the same locality”); Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly,
Pleading Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1464 (2008) (“The
primary goal from the time of the original Conformity Act was to spare the bench and bar
from having to work within two procedural systems.”).
30. See, e.g., Nudd, 91 U.S. at 441.
31. See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1039; David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the
Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (1989) (recognizing the lack
of uniformity between federal and state courts within a single state even under the conformity
regime). The Conformity Act also did not apply to admiralty cases. But this did not have the
effect of creating disuniformity because admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive.
32. Conformity Act § 5. 
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from true conformity and create variations on state procedures that
confused and frustrated the bar.33 In the end, despite the goal of
creating a uniform set of procedures applicable within a state, the
result under the Conformity Act was the creation of a jumbled and
complex procedural mess.34
Another more significant problem with the conformity regime was
that its premise—its vision of uniformity—came under attack at the
turn of the twentieth century. The complete story is a long one
involving many characters, but a key figure for present purposes is
Thomas W. Shelton, who proposed the resolution in 1911 that
eventually led to the introduction of the Rules and who chaired the
initial 1912 ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure.35
Perhaps more than anyone else, Shelton is responsible for making
national uniformity—as opposed to intrastate uniformity—the
prevailing procedural vision.36 In doing so, Shelton ran headlong
into Senator Thomas J. Walsh, who staunchly defended the
conformity regime until his death in 1933.37 The battle between
Shelton and Walsh was in large measure a battle between compet-
ing visions of uniformity. Shelton prioritized uniformity across the
federal system, although he also assumed that intrastate uniformity
would follow because states would willingly follow the federal
example.38 Walsh, on the other hand, was deeply suspicious of that
33. See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1041 (concluding that the Conformity Act “afforded
numerous opportunities for federal courts to decline conformity to state law”). 
34. See id. at 1042 (“[T]he potential complexity of an action drawing on so many sources
of procedural law[ ] made the practitioner’s job difficult.”); Report of Committee on Uniformity
of Procedure and Comparative Law, 19 A.B.A. REP. 411, 420 (1896) (suggesting that a federal
practitioner, “even in his own state, feels no more certainty as to the proper procedure than
if he were before a tribunal of a foreign country”).
35. See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1049. 
36. See id. (“Shelton argued that uniformity of procedure was essential, along with
uniformity of interpretation, to the goal of uniformity of law ... and saw a federal model,
prepared by the Supreme Court, as the best hope for national uniformity.”); Charles E. Clark
& James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 388 (1935); Stephen
N. Subrin, A New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1651 (1981) [hereinafter
Subrin, Civil Procedure].
37. See Clark & Moore, supra note 36, at 388.
38. See S. REP. NO. 64-892, pt. 1, at 21 (1917) (stating that both convenience and merit
would lead to state adoption); Clark & Moore, supra note 36, at 387 (recognizing “an unusual
opportunity” for “developing a procedure which may properly be a model to all the states”);
Subrin, Civil Procedure, supra note 36, at 1650 (“Proponents retorted that the uniform federal
rules would be a model adopted by the states.”).
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assumption and feared that the real effect of uniform federal rules
would be to create disuniformity between the state and federal
courts.39 Walsh viewed true national uniformity as a practical
impossibility and would have selected to maintain intrastate uni-
formity as the most practical approach for the majority of practicing
lawyers.40
Of course, Shelton’s vision eventually carried the day,41 helped by
the death of Walsh and the ascent of Homer Cummings as Attorney
General.42 Uniformity across all federal districts became the
aspirational standard with the passage of the Rules Enabling Act of
1934,43 and was formally achieved with the promulgation of Rule 1,
which specified that the Rules were to apply in the “district courts
of the United States.”44 But although it is accurate to say that the
Federal Rules reflect the triumph of federal trans-territoriality over
intrastate conformity, that statement does not go far enough. More
must be said about precisely why trans-territoriality became so
valued.45 Trans-territoriality triumphed because it was a means to
desired ends, and those ends are considered next.
B. The Ends of Trans-Territoriality
Over time, proponents of trans-territoriality have identified a
variety of benefits associated with geographic uniformity in federal
procedure. The primary original benefits were the facilitation of na-
39. See Clark & Moore, supra note 36, at 394.
40. See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1063-64 (noting that Walsh described himself as “for
the one hundred who stay at home as against the one who goes abroad” (quoting
Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552 Before the Subcomm.
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong. 28 (1915))).
41. Although it did not carry the day until after Shelton himself had left the scene.
42. See Burbank, supra note 23, at 1095-96 (discussing Cummings’s role).
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2006).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (1938). In 1948, the Rule was amended slightly to “in the United
States district courts.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 408
(5th Cir. 1960) (“The broad aim [of the Rules Enabling Act], especially in fields of practice,
was to reverse the philosophy of conformity to local state procedure and establish ... an
approach of uniformity within the whole federal judicial trial system.”).
45. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2000 (quoting Connor Hall’s complaint
that uniformity was too often presented “as if it were some excellence in itself ” (citing Copy
of Manuscript of Connor Hall (Oct. 15, 1926) mailed to the Editor, A.B.A. J., requesting
publication, at 2)).
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tional legal practice and the promotion of nationalized commerce.46
Later, benefits sounding in equality and efficiency were emphasized:
uniform procedure can assist in generating like outcomes in like
cases and can do so with fewer resources being devoted to litigation
and to the rulemaking process.47 Each of these benefits is enhanced
substantially if uniformity exists not just across federal districts,
but between the federal and state systems. Proponents of trans-
territoriality identified this complete procedural uniformity as a
separate end to be attained by the adoption of federal rules, and
concluded that this end was not only possible but also likely because
state rulemakers would quickly and willingly mimic their federal
counterparts.48
1. Nationalization
The standardization of procedural rules across federal districts
reflected a desire to promote, or at least to respond to, the national-
ization of both commerce and legal practice. With respect to
commerce, proponents of procedural uniformity emphasized eco-
nomic nationalization and the associated decline in the relevance of
state borders as justifications for pursuing a body of procedure that
could be applied without reference to geography.49 Along those lines,
Shelton urged uniformity in procedure as a predicate to the support
of commerce because it “give[s] an assurance of interstate judicial
relations as fixed, necessary and useful as fixed interstate commer-
cial relations.”50 
46. See infra Part I.B.1.
47. See infra Parts I.B.2-3.
48. See infra Part I.B.4.
49. These concerns also supported arguments for complete procedural uniformity because
some cases involving commerce could not be brought in federal court. See infra Part I.B.4.
There are also parallels here to arguments made in the domain of personal jurisdiction and
choice of law during roughly the same period. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1963) (recognizing that choice of law doctrine was
dramatically altered when “members of our society, in both their personal and business
activities, increasingly disregard[ed] the existence of state boundaries”); Ellen E. Sward,
Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389, 453-54 (2004) (discussing how
the creation of the minimum contacts test in International Shoe demonstrated the decreasing
importance of state boundaries).
50. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2003 (quoting THOMAS W. SHELTON,
SPIRIT OF THE COURTS 147-48 (1918)); see also Thomas W. Shelton, An American Common Law
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The legal practice argument is related. Shelton lamented that
lawyers representing national corporations could not easily navigate
the numerous federal courts in which cases might be brought
because of the barriers created by the conformity regime.51 To
facilitate the national practice of law, then, it was necessary to
remove those barriers and permit lawyers to cross state and district
lines freely. As David Shapiro has described it, the Rules were
designed to permit “lawyers who went into any federal court ... to
know what to expect and not to have to undergo an initiation period
or to rely heavily on the wisdom of local practitioners.”52 A final
argument blends the economic nationalization and legal profession
concerns: the complexity and unpredictability of the fragmented
procedural system was leading many national corporations to
pursue alternatives—such as arbitration—rather than litigation,
and national rules would have the desirable effect of encouraging a
return to the courtroom.53
2. Equality and Fairness
A second concern raised in the movement toward trans-terri-
toriality relates to equality and fairness. Many proponents of federal
rules worried that state procedural systems were inferior, and that
the conformity regime operated in practice to bind federal courts
to apply undesirable procedures.54 The inferiority of many state
in the Making—The Habit of Thinking Uniformity, 30 LAW NOTES 50, 52 (1926) (“There is no
more excuse for differing judicial procedure than for differing language in the several
States.”).
51. See Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552 Before the
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong. 13 (1915) (statement of Thomas W.
Shelton, Chairman, Uniform Judicial Procedure Committee of the American Bar Association)
(stating that federal courts “are what are called United States courts, but instead I call them
New York City courts”).
52. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1974; see also Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, supra note 13,
at 64 (arguing that the Federal Rules were designed to allow a lawyer admitted in one federal
jurisdiction to practice in any other with ease).
53. Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2005 (arguing that uniform, simple
rules—which encourage corporate participation in court forums—imply centralized
rulemaking); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 22, at 960 (noting the
ability of nonlitigation forums to apply clear, simple rules).
54. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 23, at 1042. At some level, federal courts could avoid
this result even under the conformity regime by taking advantage of the wiggle room that
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systems was attributed, at least in part, to the fact that most state
procedural rules derived from a legislative process.55 The introduc-
tion of a national process driven instead by dedicated rulemakers
was expected to lead to the development of rules that were not just
uniform, but also better.56
Even apart from any such qualitative improvements, the fact that
the Rules are applied uniformly across the federal system promotes
two different forms of equality. First, trans-territoriality contributes
to an appearance of neutrality in the sense that all cases—and all
litigants—are governed by the same set of rules. These notions of
equality and neutrality are admittedly quite formal, but even formal
equality may enhance legitimacy and increase acceptance of the
rules and the system of adjudication more generally. Ultimately,
though, trans-territorial procedure is connected to a more substan-
tive notion of equality, one that emphasizes the similar treatment
of similar cases.57 The conformity regime meant that parallel cases
were often subject to substantially different procedures, and these
procedural variations could often directly lead to variations in case
outcomes. The application of uniform procedural rules throughout
the federal system promised to reduce such inequities.58 Thus, the
trans-territoriality principle is intended to promote not just neu-
trality, but also fairness. 
This latter version of equality was implicit in the nationalization
argument, although it was not often made explicitly during the
development of the Rules.59 In order for businesses, which were
increasingly engaged in interstate commerce, to anticipate legal
responsibilities, national legal uniformity looked ever more desir-
able. This line of thinking led to a movement for uniform sub-
stantive laws,60 which naturally grew to include procedures as
existed in the Conformity Act. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
55. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2003.
56. Id. at 2001.
57. For discussions of this substantive concept of procedural equality, see Rubenstein,
supra note 8, at 1893-97; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2047. 
58. Keeton, supra note 10, at 860 (emphasizing the role of uniform rules in ensuring that
cases are “resolved in an evenhanded way so like cases are treated alike”).
59. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2006 (“This ‘uniform federal rules’ theme
ended up with four strands: interdistrict court uniformity, intrastate uniformity, trans-
substantive uniformity, and, although this was not stressed, uniformity of result.”).
60. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 70-440, pt. 2, at 10 (1928) (“The development of the economic
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well.61 Again, to the extent that states maintained different pro-
cedures, the attraction of federal rulemaking as a salve was
diminished because like cases could still receive differing procedural
treatment based on whether the case was filed in federal or state
court. And again, the response was that federal-state disuniformity
was more tolerable than federal intradistrict disuniformity, and that
full uniformity was the expected and inevitable end of the federal
rulemaking movement.62 
3. Efficiency
A third claimed benefit of trans-territoriality is enhanced
efficiency in the federal procedural system. To a large extent,
efficiency claims are retreads of the claims already discussed, albeit
with a different emphasis. For example, in addition to arguing that
lawyers would benefit from uniform federal rules because they
would be able to practice nationally, Shelton and others emphasized
that uniform rules would save client resources by permitting them
to retain a single firm to respond to federal liability that was
national in scope.63 Another source of waste that proponents of
national uniformity targeted was the time and effort devoted to
sorting out whether the state rule or the federal rule should apply
in a given situation, both at the trial and appellate levels.64 Trans-
resources of the country has brought with it problems that know no boundaries, and a growing
consciousness of the commercial necessity for national uniformity both in law and its
administration.”).
61. To be sure, there was not a complete overlap between the movement for uniform laws
and the federal rule making movement. In particular, many did not see the two as related
because they did not view procedure as having a meaningful impact on substantive outcomes.
See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV.
319, 329 (2008) (“The 1938 Federal Rule drafters thought that substance had little, if any, role
to play; in their view, most procedural rules could be justified by process values without
referring to substance at all.”).
62. See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 539 n.118
(2006) (“[A] simple, scientific, correlated system of rules, such as would be prepared and
promulgated by the Supreme Court of the United States, would prove a model that would, for
reasons of convenience as well as of principle, be adopted by the states.” (quoting Thomas W.
Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations, 23 CASE & COMMENT 388, 393 (1916))).
63. Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552 Before the
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong. 13-14 (1915) (statement of Thomas W.
Shelton, Chairman, Uniform Judicial Procedure Committee of the American Bar Association).
64. See S. REP. NO. 64-892, pt. 1, at 2 (1917) (“That cases should be delayed month after
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territoriality greatly reduced those resources by making the Federal
Rules presumptively applicable.65 And if states were to follow the
federal lead, then the efficiencies attributable to trans-territoriality
would be much greater still, in part because lawyers would need to
master only a single set of procedural rules, and in part because
time and energy would need to be devoted to only a single
rulemaking process.
4. Complete Uniformity
All of the preceding benefits of trans-territorial procedure in the
federal system were undermined at least to some extent by the fact
that states remained free to create their own procedural systems.
This meant that cases could be subject to differing procedural
requirements depending on where they were filed, thus creating just
the sort of complexity that Shelton and others sought to avoid. By
itself, the imposition of federal uniformity did nothing to guarantee
the “fixed” system that corporations apparently desired. And the
confusion wrought by the project of federal trans-territoriality was
arguably far worse for practicing lawyers because it affected those
who practiced within the territorial boundaries of a single state.66
Rather than creating the complete uniformity that would produce
meaningful benefits for the economy and the bar, the Federal Rules
appeared to promise an exchange of one form of partial uniformity
for another.
Proponents of the Federal Rules conceded that complete unifor-
mity should be the goal, and they considered that goal attainable
month, and sometimes year after year, should be reversed and tried and retried, upon mere
matters of practice that in no way touch the essential merits, is one of the reproaches in the
administration of the law which has had a greater tendency to bring the practice of the courts
into disrepute than any other thing.”); W.M. Lile, Uniform Procedure at Law in the Federal
Courts, 76 CENT. L.J. 214, 214 (1913).
65. Again, there is a similarity to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See
supra note 22. In Erie, the Supreme Court arguably created inefficiency by requiring parties
and judges to litigate the question of which procedures apply in diversity cases. See Erie, 304
U.S. at 78-80. Hanna v. Plumer reduced much of that inefficiency by making the Federal
Rules presumptively applicable when on point. 380 U.S. 460, 473-74 (1965).
66. This was Walsh’s primary argument against trans-territoriality. He argued that most
lawyers still practiced within a single state, and that uniform federal procedure would disrupt
their practice for the proposed benefit of those few who practiced nationally. Subrin, Federal
Rules, supra note 10, at 2008.
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and even likely under their approach. In their view, states were
likely to follow the lead of the Federal Rules, and the eventual
result would be not just the introduction of federal uniformity, but
the restoration of intrastate uniformity as well.67 Early returns
along these lines were promising,68 and some states continue to
replicate the Federal Rules in the interest of preserving intrastate
uniformity.69 But we have never come close to universal adoption of
the Federal Rules, and indeed the most recent sustained study
found that the gap between federal and state procedures is widen-
ing.70 Despite the failure in practical terms to achieve it, complete
procedural uniformity remains a goal that animated the selection of
a new system of federal rules over the existing conformity regime.
II. LOCAL RULES AS A PROCEDURAL SCOURGE
If trans-territoriality is one of the heroes of the federal procedural
regime, then local rules have been steadily cast in the role of the
villain. Because local rules are the most visible source of territorial
67. To borrow Stephen Subrin’s phrase, “[t]he federal rules were to be an enlightened
magnet.” Id. at 2026; see also Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil
Justice: Developing a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-
Making Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1170, 1179 (2005); Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1974-75
(describing the rulemakers as “sufficiently imbued with their mission to hope that their rules
would set a model that the states themselves would want to follow”). The idea that a federal
standard would be an “enlightened magnet” that states would find irresistible is reminiscent
of the Supreme Court’s flawed assumption with respect to federal general common law in
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). States in that context proved themselves willing to
resist the allure of the federally created example, and they have done so in this context as
well. See infra note 69.
68. See Chen, supra note 29, at 1437 (discussing the development of “federal replica”
states—states that have adopted the Federal Rules—beginning with Arizona in 1940); Subrin,
Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2026-28 (noting that four southwestern states were relatively
quick to adopt the Federal Rules verbatim—Arizona (1940), Colorado (1941), New Mexico
(1942), and Utah (1950)—with the goal of fostering a procedural system that practitioners
could easily navigate).
69. See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of
State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1377 (1986) (classifying
twenty-three states as federal replicas, many of whom identify intrastate uniformity as their
guiding value).
70. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J.
354, 358 (2002) (finding that 62 percent of the United States population lives in jurisdictions
“governed by substantially nonfederal systems of procedure” and that state movements
toward replicating the federal procedural system were “noticeably slackening”).
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variation in the federal procedural system, they are the most
obvious deviation from the aspirational norm of trans-territoriality.
Part II reviews the long-standing and ongoing debate over local
rules. It first describes the current approach toward local rules in
the federal system and explains how that approach has changed
over time, particularly with respect to promulgation and enforce-
ment. It then reviews the numerous complaints that have been laid
at the feet of local rules, most of which are rooted in a commitment
to trans-territorial procedure and a parallel resistance to territorial
variation.
A. A Primer on Local Rules
The authority for local rules is clear and unassailable: Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a), which has been part of the Federal
Rules since their inception, permits district courts to “make and
amend rules governing [their] practice.”71 The scope of the authority
provided is not unlimited, however; local rules must be consistent
with—but not duplicative of Acts of Congress and rules.72 Although
that limitation is not insignificant, it leaves substantial room for
district courts to create a set of localized procedures, and every
district court has done so.73 The resulting ninety-four sets of local
rules are, like the Federal Rules, formal and fixed. Unlike the
Federal Rules, however, local rules are not subject to the rule-
making process outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74, but are instead
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). Local rules must be issued after “notice and an opportunity
for comment,” and must be supported by a majority of the district judges comprising a district
court. Id. 
72. Id. For a time, it looked as though another limitation, created not by the Rules
themselves but by the Supreme Court, might be imposed: local rules should not introduce
“basic procedural innovations.” Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960) (favoring the formal
rulemaking process and its “mature consideration of informed opinion”). But the Court has
not appeared willing to police the limitation, and the experience with civil jury size seriously
undermines its force. See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1561, 1582-83 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973), which upheld local rules changing the size of the civil jury).
73. For a list of current local rules, see United States Courts, Local Court Rules—United
States District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/
LocalCourtRules/USDistrictCourt.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
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promulgated after notice and comment and upon a majority vote of
district judges.74
Local rules vary considerably in both content and significance.
Many local rules announce technical and relatively mundane
requirements related to issues like filing and motions practice.75
Rules detailing paper size and method of binding are staples of local
rules,76 designed primarily to facilitate the work of the clerk’s office.
But not all rules fit that description, and some impose substantial
procedural requirements. For example, many districts now have
local rules that structure the summary judgment process, including
details relating to the form and nature of the filings that must be
submitted.77 
Because local rules vary from district to district, lawyers who
practice in multiple districts must master multiple sets of formal
procedural packages.78 Thus far, the Advisory Committee has re-
sponded to the burdens imposed by interdistrict variations in local
rules not by removing or narrowing the authority to issue them,79 
74. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
75. See, e.g., E.D. CAL. R. 121(b) (“The regular office hours of the Clerk at Sacramento and
Fresno shall be from 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. each day except Saturdays, Sundays, legal
holidays, and such other times so ordered by the Chief Judge.”). More recently, local rules
describing electronic filing requirements have become common. See, e.g., W.D.N.C. R. 5.2.1(B)
(“All documents submitted for filing in this district shall be filed electronically unless
expressly exempted from electronic filing either by the Administrative Procedures or by the
assigned judge.”).
76. See, e.g., E.D. CAL. R. 130(b) (“All documents presented for conventional filing or
lodging and the chambers courtesy copies shall be on white, unglazed opaque paper of good
quality with numbered lines in the left margin, 8-1/2" x 11" in size, and shall be flat, unfolded
(except where necessary for presentation of exhibits), firmly bound at the top left corner, pre-
punched with two (2) holes (approximately 1/4" diameter) centered 2-3/4" apart, 1/2" to 5/8"
from the top edge of the document, and shall comply with all other applicable provisions of
these Rules.”).
77. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. R. 56.1. For a discussion of cases enforcing this rule, see infra notes
87-89 and accompanying text.
78. See G.J.B. & Assocs., Inc. v. Singleton, 913 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Counsel
appearing before the district court are duty-bound to know the practice of the district court.”).
79. In the 1985 amendments, the Advisory Committee did alter the rule “to enhance the
local rulemaking process by requiring appropriate public notice of proposed rules and an
opportunity to comment on them.” FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note (1985). But
this modification retained the scope of local rulemaking authority, and was explicitly made
“without impairing the procedural validity of existing local rules.” Id. Several commentators
have suggested that the authority for local rulemaking authority be narrowed. See, e.g., Linda
J. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis as a Method for Determining the Validity of Federal
District Courts’ Exercise of Local Rulemaking Power: Application to Local Rules Mandating
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but instead by instituting measures designed to facilitate identifica-
tion and compliance and to decrease sanctions for noncompliance in
certain cases.80 In particular, the 1995 amendments to Rule 83
included two notable new provisions. First, Rule 83(a)(1) was modi-
fied to require local rules to “conform to any uniform numbering
system prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the United
States.”81 This addition was intended to avoid “unnecessary traps for
counsel and litigants” by “mak[ing] it easier for an increasingly
national bar and for litigants to locate a local rule that applies to a
particular procedural issue.”82 Second, the same set of amendments
added a provision—Rule 83(a)(2)—that prevents the court from
depriving a party of rights as a result of a “nonwillful failure to
comply” with a “local rule imposing a requirement of form.”83 Again,
the Advisory Committee’s notes reflect an awareness that lawyers
may be burdened by the complexities of local rules, and may
therefore be unaware or forgetful of formal requirements contained
therein.84
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483, 497 (1991) (arguing that the federal
courts’ judgment about procedure should be subordinated to congressional judgment in order
to “ensure that Congress makes the important decisions about procedure”).
While the Advisory Committee has declined to decrease the authority for local rulemaking,
it has also declined to increase it. Most notably, the Committee withdrew two proposed
amendments to Rule 83 that would have permitted district courts to introduce local rules that
were inconsistent with the Federal Rules, at least on an experimental basis. See Comm. on
Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991) (“With the approval of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, a district court may adopt an experimental local rule
inconsistent with [the Federal Rules].”); Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the
Judicial Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, and Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in
the United States District Courts, reprinted in 98 F.R.D. 337, 370 (1983) (“When authorized
by the judicial council, a district court may adopt on an experimental basis for no longer than
two years a local rule that may not be challenged for inconsistency with [the Federal Rules].”);
see also Marcus, supra note 72, at 1584 n.95.
80. Congress has intervened, too. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (2006) (permitting the
“judicial council of the relevant circuit” to modify or abrogate local rules). 
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note (1995).
83. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(2). 
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note (1995) (“[A] party should not be deprived
of a right to a jury trial because its attorney, unaware of—or forgetting—a local rule directing
that jury demands be noted in the caption of the case, includes a jury demand only in the body
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Although the addition of Rule 83(a)(2) limits the availability of
sanctions, it simultaneously confirms that some local rules—
namely, those that do not impose “a requirement of form”—may be
enforced to deprive a party of rights. Local rules in that category
essentially operate as functional equivalents to the federal rules;
district courts demand compliance and may strictly enforce the rules
or impose sanctions when procedural requirements are not followed.
Some districts include specific provisions highlighting the availabil-
ity of sanctions for violations of local rules.85 But even in the absence
of such a provision, sanctions for failure to heed the requirements
of local rules have been upheld when challenged in the appellate
courts.86 For example, in a series of cases, the Seventh Circuit has
affirmed the entry of summary judgment in cases in which a
nonmovant fails to comply with the procedural requirements of
Northern District of Illinois Rule 56.1.87 In doing so, the court has
recognized that the rule “impose[s] a burden on the attorneys for the
parties,”88 but has nevertheless emphasized that “strict, consistent,
‘bright-line’ enforcement is essential to obtaining compliance ... and
to ensuring that long-run aggregate benefits in efficiency inure to
district courts.”89
of the pleading.”).
85. See, e.g., M.D. ALA. R. 1.2 (“The court may impose a sanction for the violation of any
local rule. Imposition of sanctions will lie within the sound discretion of the judge whose case
is affected.”).
86. Not all efforts to impose sanctions for violations of local rules have been upheld. See,
e.g., Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[W]e do not think that
the imposition of financial sanctions for mere negligent violations of the local rules is
consistent with the intent of Congress or with the restraint required of the federal courts in
sanction cases.”). But in cases where the sanction has been viewed as an abuse of discretion,
the basis for that finding has been that the sanction imposed was not proportional to the
violation at issue, not that local rules are entitled to a lesser degree of enforcement than the
Federal Rules. 
87. See, e.g., Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 2004);
Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases where
strict enforcement of local summary judgment rules has been upheld). Implicit in Koszola and
other cases decided after the 1995 addition of Rule 83(a)(2) is a determination that N.D. ILL.
R. 56.1 does not merely impose a “requirement of form.”
88. Markham v. White, 172 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1999).
89. Midwest Imps., Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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B. A Primer on Local Rules Critique
Notwithstanding their pedigree, local rules have faced consistent
criticism since the Federal Rules were promulgated in 1938. Part
II.B undertakes a short review of that criticism, which has taken
many forms, ranging from claims that frequent deviations from
trans-territoriality are inconsistent with the original intent of Rule
83 to claims that such deviations are undesirable for various
functional reasons. Particulars aside, the core criticism of local rules
is that they disrupt the trans-territoriality that is a central
procedural value of the federal system. 
An initial complaint is that the fundamental constraint that local
rules be consistent with, and not duplicative of, existing federal
rules has frequently been ignored.90 From the very beginning,
federal districts introduced local rules that were at least arguably
inconsistent with the Federal Rules, and as early as 1940 a federal
committee commented on the danger such rules imposed to the
goal of national uniformity.91 Similarly, in the 1980s, the Judicial
Conference sponsored a Local Rules Project, which found and
catalogued a variety of local rules that seemed to contradict the
consistency limitation in Rule 83.92 The existence of local rules that
directly conflict with extant federal rules has the potential to under-
mine the supremacy of the federal rulemaking process.93 Not only is
this theoretically troubling, but it also contributes to a practical
problem: counsel will reasonably be uncertain about whether the
federal rule or the local rule will ultimately be enforced.94
90. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2019-20 (noting that a 1985 Judiciary
Committee report “identified several problems concerning local rules, such as their
promulgation without sufficient input, the tremendous numbers of such rules, and the
frequent conflict between local rules and the Federal Rules”).
91. See Report on Local District Court Rules, 4 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 969 (1940)
[hereinafter Knox Committee Report]. 
92. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT 1-7 (1988).
93. Sisk, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing the destruction of procedural uniformity within
the appellate system due to the promulgation of local rules that conflict with the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure).
94. Id. at 5-6; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2016-17 (noting that local rules
“create inconsistencies in practice among the various districts and leave doubt and
uncertainty in the minds of the bench and bar” (quoting Knox Committee Report, supra note
91, at 11)).
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Restricting local rules to only those that comply with the con-
sistency restraint would address these problems, of course, and
indeed many critics have called for more rigorous enforcement of the
clear language of Rule 83.95 But most criticisms of local rules go
much further, and target even those rules that undeniably comply
with that language. These broader critiques are based in part on a
claim that the intended scope of Rule 83 was sufficiently narrow
that local rules would be used only sparingly.96 Proposals to permit
and even encourage broad authority for localized rulemaking were
considered but rejected, and ultimately national uniformity was
embraced as the prevailing model.97 Although Rule 83 was still
included in the final product, its inclusion did not signify a desire to
promote local rules as a means of filling any gaps that might have
been left open by the Federal Rules. Rather, the Rule was intended
to provide authority only for the rare occasions when the federal
rulemakers deliberately left gaps to be filled by local needs.98 Thus,
the use of Rule 83 for a broader gap-filling purpose is against the
spirit of the federal design, even if the resulting local rules techni-
cally comply with the consistency restraint.
The preceding argument is not merely a technical one about
intent. Critics also cite a functional reason to interpret and apply
narrowly the authority conferred by Rule 83: the proliferation of
local rules creates a morass of applicable rules in the federal system
95. See 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
§ 3152 (2nd ed. 1973); David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure:
Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
537, 540-42 (1985) (arguing that a failure to enforce the consistency requirement of Rule 83
has allowed for the promulgation of local rules directly in conflict with their federal
counterparts).
96. Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE
L.J. 929, 944 (1996) (discussing the intent of the rulemakers that Rule 83 be used only on the
rare occasions that functionally demand localization); Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman,
The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 784 (1995) (“Absent some better
reason, it is insufficient simply to argue in favor of local rules for no other reason than that
locals like to do things a certain way.”); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 10,
at 538 (“The Committee apparently envisioned that districts would sparingly invoke Rule 83
to address unusual, troubling local circumstances and expressly prohibited the adoption of
local procedures which conflicted with the federal rules.”).
97. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text. 
98. Carrington, supra note 96, at 944; Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note
10, at 538 (discussing the Advisory Committee’s intent to have judges “sparingly invoke Rule
83”). 
438 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:415
that directly conflicts with the procedural goals served by trans-
territoriality.99 Local rules run counter to the goal of nationalization
because they disadvantage nonlocal counsel—often explicitly so.100
At the extreme, variations in local rules also threaten the equal
treatment of like cases and may contribute to forum shopping.101
This result is especially troubling because districts often fail to
explain the reasons for their adoption of a particular rule, which
increases the likelihood that participants and observers will
perceive variations as random rather than well considered.102
Finally, local rules are viewed by many as a source of inefficiency in
federal practice, both because lawyers must devote resources to
mastering multiple sets of local rules and because clients may be
forced to retain local counsel for each federal district involved in a
complex case.103
99. Critics also complain that local rules undermine the procedural value of trans-
substantivity. See, e.g., Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2025-26 (noting that the use
of local rules to fashion different procedures for particular types of cases in different locations
“reduces intrastate and interdistrict court procedural uniformity”).
100. Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 96, at 784 (“The premise of the federal courts
is that they reflect one court system doing the nation’s business. Permitting a profusion of
local rules for the simple reason that local practioners [sic] are familiar with them
inappropriately disadvantages litigants and their counsel coming from out of state.”); Lauren
Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1484
(1994) (“Local procedures typically favor local bars.”).
101. Keeton, supra note 10, at 860 (noting that national uniformity serves the fundamental
interest that disputes should be treated alike and resolved on the merits, rather than being
subject to manipulation based on judge shopping or forum shopping).
102. Carrington, supra note 96, at 945-46 (noting that “the primary task of each federal
court is essentially the same in all districts, and the differences among them seldom suggest
reasons for material differences in the procedure employed in different districts”); Tobias,
Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 577 (discussing the loss of respect for the civil
litigation system that occurs when the public “believes that the procedures available or the
character of justice can vary substantially across districts, that the nature of justice reflects
lawsuits’ magnitude or subject matter, that attorneys’ or clients’ resources affect the quality
of justice, or that complexities or technicalities preclude or restrict the vindication of rights”).
103. See, e.g., Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, supra note 13, at 62 (noting that the only safe
course of action for a client whose case spills into multiple federal districts may be to “retain
additional counsel in each federal district for the case”); Sisk, supra note 10, at 6, 31 (arguing
that local rule variations “complicate practice and increase the cost of compliance with
procedural rules” while simultaneously requiring “inordinate expenditures of attorney time
on relatively minor matters”); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 10, at 575
(“The need to search for, understand, and comply with increasingly arcane local requirements
may well have imposed greater expense and delay in federal civil litigation.”).
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A different strain of criticism focuses on perceived deficiencies in
the way that local rules are promulgated and reviewed.104 Whereas
federal rules are introduced only after a thorough process that
includes a broad group of participants and several layers of review,
the process leading to the introduction of local rules is relatively
more  truncated.105  For one thing, fewer participants are involved.
Of course, it is precisely the narrower geographical scope of the
participants that permits local rules to reflect local, rather than
national, priorities. Even so, the lack of broader input has led to
some concern that local rules are adopted on the basis of inadequate
information.106 In addition, there are fewer steps in the process
leading to the adoption of local rules. For many years, that process
essentially consisted of deliberation involving only the judges of the
relevant local district.107 Although Rule 83 has been amended to now
require an opportunity for notice and comment, district judges
remain the ultimate arbiters of whether local rules are adopted or
abandoned. This has led to a concern that local rules are often a
simple reflection of the temporary whims of the majority of a
district’s judges.108 That concern in turn is exacerbated by the
104. Some of these process concerns have been addressed by modifications to Rule 83. In
particular, the 1985 rule amendments responded to criticisms regarding the lack of
nonjudicial input “by requiring appropriate public notice of proposed rules and an opportunity
to comment on them.” FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note (1985); Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 708-12 (2010) (per curiam) (emphasizing the role of notice and comment
in the promulgation of local rules); supra note 79.
105. Flanders, supra note 11, at 256-57 (describing the method by which local rules are
promulgated as “failing to meet the high standard set by the national process” and noting that
the practice of consulting with a committee of local practitioners during the drafting of local
rules “is the exception rather than the rule” (quoting 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3152, at 220 (2nd ed. 1973))); Keeton, supra note
10, at 860 (suggesting that the safeguards of the federal rulemaking process—widespread
involvement of national actors and extensive deliberation by those actors—make it more
desirable than the system of individualized promulgation for local rules).
106. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2019-20 (identifying the lack of “sufficient
input” during promulgation of local rules as one of the problems identified in a 1985 Judiciary
Committee report on local rules).
107. See Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, supra note 13, at 62 (complaining about the lack
of opportunity for notice and comment under the pre-1985 version of Rule 83).
108. Flanders, supra note 11, at 218 (noting that many critics of local rules believe that
these rules are usually “developed with minimal consultation and often represent the whims
and idiosyncrasies of temporary majorities of judges”); Keeton, supra note 10, at 860
(“[N]ationally uniform rules protect ... against the tyranny of any unduly willful renegades
among us trial judges.”); Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2042.
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limited and ineffective review of local rules by the appellate courts
and the Judicial Conference.109 
A final set of complaints emphasizes the relationship between
local rules and the federal rulemaking process. For example, Erwin
Chemerinsky and Barry Friedman have argued that the local
rulemaking device permits federal rulemakers to avoid difficult
questions that should properly be resolved at the national level.110
Conversely, local actors who perceive a need for a shift in the rules
may focus their efforts at the local level rather than seeking
desirable national reform.111 Lauren Robel has similarly suggested
that local rules undermine the federal rulemaking process because
they are too often rooted in a sense that a national rule is incorrect
rather than simply incomplete.112 Thus, local rules in practice may
represent a form of disobedience, and one that deflects energy away
from a valuable national conversation about the desirability of the
Federal Rules.
III. THE UNIVERSE OF TERRITORIAL VARIATION
Local rules are the most obvious form of procedural disuniformity,
and also the most frequently criticized. But they are certainly not
the only form. Part III widens the lens to resituate local rules as one
form of territorial variation in the federal system among many.
Some varieties, like standing orders, are quite similar in nature and
function to local rules. Others, like variations in interpretation or
the exercise of judicial discretion, are structurally different. Local
rules create formal variations in the body of procedural rules; by
109. See Flanders, supra note 11, at 218 (describing the inadequacy of the appellate process
for monitoring the validity of local rules); Sisk, supra note 10, at 51 (discussing limited review
by the Judicial Conference).
110. Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 96, at 779 (explaining that local rules can
politically benefit federal decision makers by allowing them to “duck deciding a hard question
by leaving it to local rules to handle,” especially in highly controversial areas where proposed
solutions are likely to produce intense disagreement).
111. Id. (finding that a sense of localism may contribute to the lack of uniformity in local
rules because individuals may feel that local solutions will produce more satisfaction and are
easier to implement).
112. Robel, supra note 100, at 1484 (“Local court tinkering with the Federal Rules is rarely
inspired by the disutility of a Rule under local conditions. Rather, it is inspired by a belief that
the rulemakers got it wrong.”).
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contrast, differences in interpretation create differences in the way
that formally uniform rules are applied in practice. Such differences
arguably do not create disuniformity at all, but only if one accepts
a cramped and unrealistic view of uniformity.113 Finally, other vari-
eties, like the use of inherent authority and the development of
procedural common law, occur outside the domain of the Federal
Rules themselves. Again, this might suggest that the formal uni-
formity of the Rules is not threatened. But even if that is true, these
varieties contribute to territorial variations in the procedural
requirements that are imposed and enforced, whether as the result
of a formal rule or not.
A. Standing Orders 
Unlike local rules, which operate at the level of the district court,
standing orders operate more narrowly, at the level of the individual
district judge. The present authority for standing orders is the same
as that for local rules,114 and the permissible scope of standing
orders is similarly limited by a consistency requirement. But
requiring standing orders to be consistent with federal law, federal
rules, and local rules still leaves room for variation. So it is unsur-
prising that standing orders vary significantly in terms of their level
of detail and the nature of their requirements.115 
113. See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 10, at 2047-48 (arguing that uniformity should
encompass uniformity of result, and not simply textual uniformity). For further discussion of
this point, see infra Part IV.A. 
114. Rule 83(b) permits a judge to “regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal
law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and local rules of the district.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 83(b). This language was originally added as a part of the 1985 amendments to Rule
83, and was moved to subsection (b) as part of the 1995 amendments. Prior to 1985, the
authority of judges to issue and enforce standing orders was understood to be part of the
court’s inherent authority. See infra Part III.D. For a general discussion of standing orders,
see Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges’ Practices: An Inadvertent
Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (1994).
115. Many standing orders clarify the judge’s preference with respect to scheduling. So, for
example, in the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Milton I. Shadur’s standing orders set
cases for status conferences forty-nine days after filing of the complaint, whereas Judge
Robert W. Gettleman sets cases for status sixty days after filing. See United States District
Court: Northern District of Illinois, Judge, http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Judges.aspx
(follow individual judge hyperlink; then follow “Initial Status Conference” hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 13, 2010). Other standing orders impose requirements that are fairly substantive
in nature. For example, Judge Frank D. Whitney (W.D.N.C.) requires that 
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The requirements for creation and promulgation of standing
orders are remarkably informal. Unlike federal rules, which must
pass through the formal rulemaking procedures outlined in 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074, and unlike local rules, which must receive the
support of a majority of the district judges after a notice and
comment period dictated by Rule 83(a),116 standing orders can
simply be issued by an individual district judge. At least in theory,
this informality is counterbalanced by two restrictions on standing
orders that go beyond the consistency requirement already dis-
cussed. First, the Advisory Committee’s notes express a “hope[ ] that
each district will adopt procedures, perhaps by local rule, for
promulgating and reviewing single-judge standing orders.”117 More
importantly, the 1995 amendments acknowledge “that courts rely
on multiple directives to control practice,” and that “the sheer
volume of directives may impose an unreasonable barrier.”118 As
with the amendments relating to local rules, Rule 83(b) responds to
that barrier not by circumscribing the permissible scope of standing
Every preliminary motion shall ... include, or be accompanied by, a brief
statement of the factual and legal grounds on which the motion is based. A
memorandum of law shall always state the “Bottom Line Up Front”—that is, the
introductory paragraph(s) shall: (i) identify with particularity each issue in
dispute; (ii) concisely (i.e., in one or two sentences) state why the party should
prevail on the issue, directing the Court’s attention to what the party believes
to be the controlling legal authority or critical fact in contention; and (iii) if
applicable, state the remedy or relief sought. 
Initial Scheduling Order, Misc. No. 3:07-MC-47 (Doc. No. 2), sec. 3, subsec. b, para. iii,
available at http://www.ncwd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Whitney/StandingOrderGoverning
CivilCaseManagement.pdf. Finally, some standing orders impose requirements that directly
contradict the parallel local rule. For example, Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater (N.D. Tex.) modifies
local civil rule 16.4, which requires a pretrial order to be submitted at least ten days before
the scheduled date for trial, by forcing proposed orders to be submitted no later than fourteen
days prior to the date of the trial setting. United States District Court: Northern District of
Texas, Requirements for Chief District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater, http://www.txnd.uscourts.
gov/judges/sfitz_req.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
116. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (2006) also requires notice and comment before a local rule may
be issued.
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note (1985). See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for
Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 359, 364 (1995) (“[S]ome
circuit judicial councils initiated rigorous efforts, and others made laudable attempts, to
comply with the requirements that Rule 83 and the 1988 JIA imposed on them.”). But see
Bromberg & Korn, supra note 114, at 9 (“Unfortunately, however, judicial councils have not
taken an active role in reviewing the consistency of either local district court rules or
individual judges’ standing orders and practices with the Federal Rules.”). 
118. FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note (1995).
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orders, but by requiring actual notice be given to litigants before
standing orders may be enforced to impose a “sanction or other
disadvantage.”119 Actual notice is often achieved by making standing
orders publicly available on a court website and by referring parties
to those orders.120
Standing orders that meet the consistency and notice require-
ments may be enforced, and sanctions for noncompliance have
withstood challenges on appeal. In Tucker v. Colorado Department
of Health & Environment, for example, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the entry of summary judgment after the nonmovant failed to
comply with a standing order that required specific references to the
record.121 In essence, the judge’s standing order in Tucker was
treated as an equivalent to the local rules at issue in the Seventh
Circuit cases described above,122 except that a finding of actual
notice was required to justify enforcement. But not all appellate
courts have put standing orders on an equal footing with local rules,
and some have expressed hesitation about the imposition of
sanctions for nonwillful failures to comply. An example of this more
restrained approach is found in United States v. Brown.123 There,
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that violations of local rules may be
sanctioned absent a finding of bad faith, but refused to apply the
same standard to standing orders.124 Although both local rules and
standing orders are explicitly authorized by Rule 83, the court
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) (“No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for
noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local district
rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case with actual notice
of the requirement.”).
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) advisory committee’s note (1995) (“Furnishing litigants with
a copy outlining the judge’s practices ... would suffice to give actual notice, as would an order
in a case specifically adopting by reference a judge’s standing order and indicating how copies
can be obtained.”); see also Tucker v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, 104 F. App’x 704,
707-08 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding “actual notice” satisfied where district judge issued a case
management order that “notified counsel that they could receive copies of the summary
judgment rules from the clerk’s office and from the court’s website”).
121. Tucker, 104 F. App’x at 707 (“Pursuant to [Rule 83(b)], a district judge may establish
personal ‘standing orders’ regulating practice before his court (and subsequently punish
parties for violating those rules), so long as (1) those procedures are consistent with federal
law and the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) the violating party had ‘actual notice’ of the
rule.”).
122. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
123. 62 F. App’x 165, 165 (9th Cir. 2003).
124. Id.
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recognized a distinction in treatment based on the fact that standing
orders are issued without notice and comment.125 Accordingly, the
district court’s sanctioning authority with respect to standing orders
was deemed to derive from inherent authority rather than congres-
sional authority.126
Regardless of the precise standard necessary to sustain sanctions
for noncompliance, the role of standing orders in shaping the
procedural landscape should not be ignored. They represent an
important source for procedural requirements that are judicially
controlled, and that vary even within a given federal district. 
B. Procedural Interpretation
Local rules and standing orders create differences in the formal
rules that apply to a given case. Properly understood, the overall
procedural package consists not just of federal rules, but also of local
rules and standing orders,127 and each of these latter components
may vary from district to district, or from court to court. But actual
differences in the formal procedural requirements are not the only
source of procedural variation. Disuniformity may also result from
differences in the interpretation and application of uniform rules.
Put differently, federal rules are like statutes, regulations, and
constitutional provisions: they are often ambiguous, and courts
must resolve that ambiguity through interpretation. 
Part of the Supreme Court’s self-definition of its role in the
federal system is to resolve interpretive ambiguities.128 Thus, the
extent of disuniformity attributable to ambiguity is tempered by
Supreme Court intervention and clarification. But the Court has
certainly not resolved every ambiguity in the Federal Rules, and
variations in interpretations persist. For example, the work-product
protection in Rule 26(b)(3) shields from discovery many documents
125. Id.
126. The Ninth Circuit had previously found that the sanctioning authority associated with
violations of local rules derives from both inherent and congressional authority. See Zambrano
v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1989).
127. And arguably also orders issued pursuant to the court’s inherent authority. See infra
Part III.D.
128. See Frost, supra note 14, at 1569.
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prepared “in anticipation of litigation.”129 Although this protection
is not new, and can be directly traced to Supreme Court action,130
the Court has never resolved the meaning of the “in anticipation of
litigation” requirement. Left to their own devices, the circuit courts
have developed competing tests, one requiring that a document
be “prepared ‘because of ’ existing or expected litigation,”131 and the
other requiring that a document be prepared “primarily or exclu-
sively to assist in litigation.”132
Moreover, even when the Court has attempted to impose a
uniform interpretation, disuniformity often remains because the
Court’s rulings are themselves subject to variable interpretation.
The evolving meaning of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires that a com-
plaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim,” presents
a recent illustration along these lines. The classic interpretation
of that language in Conley v. Gibson emphasized that the pleading
requirements under the rules are rooted in notice, and perform only
a very weak screening for legal sufficiency.133 In response to
perceptions of frivolous lawsuits and caseload pressures, some
appellate courts began to read the language of Rule 8(a)(2) to raise
the pleading bar and require facts beyond those that would provide
129. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
130. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 497 (1947).
131. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998).
132. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542 (5th Cir. 1982). For an extended
discussion of these competing tests, see Claudine Pease-Wingenter, Prophetic or Misguided?:
The Fifth Circuit’s (Increasingly) Unpopular Approach to the Work Product Doctrine, 29 REV.
LITIG. 121 (2009) (complaining that the “because of” standard results in “an abbreviated
scope” of work-product protection in the Fifth Circuit). There are numerous other examples
of competing rule interpretations that have gone unresolved by the Supreme Court. For a
sampling, see Natasha Dasani, Note, Class Actions and the Interpretation of Monetary
Damages Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 197 (2006)
(describing a circuit split in the interpretation of the Advisory Committee’s note regarding the
availability of monetary damages in class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2)); Daniel R.
Fine, Comment, Defining the Appellate Universe: Does FRCP 52(b) Impose a Duty on
Litigants?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1633, 1640-44 (2008) (comparing approaches to whether a Rule
52(b) motion is required to preserve appeal of inadequate findings by a district judge); Kirin
K. Gill, Comment, Depose and Expose: The Scope of Authorized Deposition Changes Under
Rule 30(e), 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357, 369-72 (2007) (discussing competing approaches to the
meaning of “changes in form or substance” under Rule 30(e)).
133. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasizing that a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim should be granted on legal insufficiency grounds only when “it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
entitle him to relief”). 
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notice.134 In two cases a decade apart, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that the plain language of the Rules permits heightened
pleading only for claims of fraud or mistake, and reaffirmed the
Conley standard for all remaining claims.135 That the Court felt the
need to take and decide a second case on the same basic issue
suggests that its initial effort failed to settle the interpretive
instability that prompted the intervention. In 2007, the Court
disrupted whatever stability it had secured in its prior efforts by
revisiting the pleading question yet again, this time to undo much
of what Conley had settled fifty years earlier by inserting in its place
a “plausibility” standard that is far from self-defining.136 Most
recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reaffirmed its commitment
to the plausibility regime, confirmed the application of that regime
to all federal civil cases,137 and characterized the determination of
134. See, e.g., Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 305, 309 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[I]n an effort to
eliminate nonmeritorious claims on the pleadings and to protect public officials from
protracted litigation involving specious claims we, and other courts, have tightened the
application of Rule 8 to § 1983 cases.”). Either that, or they interpreted Rule 9(b) to permit
a court to impose “heightened pleading” beyond the two claims specifically mentioned. The
history of resistance to the “notice pleading” standard created by Rule 8(a)(2) actually goes
back much further. See, e.g., Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for
Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253 (1952); Baim
& Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (imposing a
heightened pleading standard for antitrust claims). The Supreme Court’s decision in Conley
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), quieted that resistance to some extent, but not entirely. See
Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968) (imposing heightened pleading for civil
rights claims); see also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
987, 988 (2003) (describing the widespread practice by federal courts of imposing heightened
pleading standards “in direct contravention of notice pleading doctrine”).
135. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 511-14 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
136. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions To Dismiss
Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2007); A. Benjamin
Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008). Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007) (per curiam), which the Court decided just weeks after Twombly, further exacerbated
the uncertainty because it seemed to reaffirm the pre-Twombly notice pleading standard.
Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the Era of
Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2012 (2010). 
Of course, it is questionable how much disruption Twombly actually created because it is
unclear whether interpretive stability ever existed with respect to Rule 8(a)(2). See Sutliff,
Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that courts never really
believed the Conley language). 
137. The plausibility standard does not apply to those cases covered by alternative pleading
regimes, such as Rule 9(b) or the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. See generally
Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002) (comparing
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what constitutes plausibility as “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.”138 The first two of these actions arguably improves the
clarity of pleading standards; the third all but assures that interpre-
tive differences will linger in the lower courts indefinitely.139
C. Procedural Discretion 
A third source of procedural disuniformity is discretion provided
by the Rules themselves.140 Many procedural rules establish fixed
requirements that do not permit discretion; rules establishing time
limitations are examples.141 But many other rules operate much
judicially imposed pleading standards with the heightened statutory pleading requirements
in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Y2K Act); Jeffrey A. Parness et al.,
The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV. 412 (1999)
(reviewing statutory pleading standards). 
138. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
139. See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 61 n.42 (2010)
(comparing critics’ varying definitions of what constitutes a “conclusory” allegation to satisfy
the “New Pleading” standard); Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the
Probable: Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L. REV. 505, 520-26 (2009) (describing how different circuits have
interpreted the Iqbal standard); see also Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After
Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 498-503 (2010) (noting that baseline assumptions and judge’s
experiences must inherently factor into determinations of plausibility); Suja A. Thomas, The
New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion To Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) (arguing that the pleading standard after Iqbal makes
the motion to dismiss equivalent in standard—and possibly in effect—to a motion for
summary judgment). 
In part because of the disuniformity and lack of stability generated by judicial
interpretations of federal rules, Catherine Struve has criticized judicial assertions of broad
interpretive authority in the context of the Federal Rules. See generally Catherine T. Struve,
The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1099, 1119 (2002) (criticizing broad interpretive authority in the context of federal rules).
According to Professor Struve, the rule making process implies that courts should approach
interpretation narrowly.
140. Interpretation might also be viewed as a form of discretion provided by the Rules. See
Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV.
1961, 1970 (2007) (referring to “[i]nterpretive [d]iscretion,” and arguing that some rules may
be “purposefully written in vague language precisely so trial judges could adapt them to the
circumstances of specific cases”). But for purposes of clarity, I treat the two distinctly, and
refer here only to explicit delegations of discretionary authority contained within the Rules.
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (specifying twenty-eight days after a jury verdict as the time limit
for renewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)
(explaining how to measure a twenty-eight day limitation); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2) (removing
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differently, and instead direct the court to exercise case-specific
discretion.142 To the extent that different judges exercise the
discretion afforded them under the rules differently, the result will
be disuniformity in the procedures actually applied in a given
case.143 In other words, uniform rules do not necessarily guarantee
uniform procedures, even in the absence of interpretive ambiguity.
The most discussed area of procedural discretion in recent years
has been the case management authority provided by Rule 16.144
The received wisdom regarding Rule 16 suggests that the 1983
amendments created space for judges to become much more ag-
gressive during pretrial case management.145 What that account
misses is that judges were already exercising significant discretion
under the pre-amendment version of the rule, so much so that the
“metamorphosis was virtually a fait accompli.”146 What led to the
judicial authority to extend the twenty-eight day limit under Rule 50(b)). But many rules
establishing time limits may themselves be subject to judicial discretion. See FED. R. CIV. P.
6(b) (generally permitting the court to extend time “for good cause”).
142. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 22, at 923 n.76 (identifying
thirty-six distinct federal rules that explicitly delegate case-specific discretion). Indeed, rules
fitting this description may be rules in name only. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992) (discussing the forms of rules and standards). 
143. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 22, at 982-85 (arguing
for stricter rules to reduce discretion and promote procedural consistency).
144. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 379-80 & n.20 (1982)
[hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges]; Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1969-72.
145. See Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action
Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 407 n.130 (1987) (“The focus on pretrial management is reflected
in the total revision of [R]ule 16 in 1983 providing specific authority for early judicial control
of case scheduling.”); Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 818, 823 (1988) (“Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to make specific what had
probably been intended from the beginning—that the trial judge was indeed the ruler, not
only of the pretrial conference, but of the entire pretrial process.”). The amendments to Rule
16 did more than just “create space,” of course; they also required early judicial involvement
in all cases, subject to categorical exclusions created by district courts. By adding a
requirement of judicial involvement, the amendments to Rule 16 signaled that judges not only
had authority to manage cases, but were expected to use it. See Marcus, supra note 72, at
1588 (“Beginning in 1983, Rule 16 was amended to require case management activity by all
judges in most cases, and to encourage more managerial activity than was required.”)
(emphasis added); Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary Judgment: A Proposal for
Procedure Reform in the Core Motion Context, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1647 (1995)
(“Only with the revision of Rule 16 in 1983, when a ‘mandatory’ obligation to generate
schedule orders was grafted onto the text, did the pretrial rule begin to pressure judges to
assume a managerial posture.”). 
146. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1992. 
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rise of managerial judging was not a formal change in Rule 16, but
a change in the willingness of courts to exercise the authority they
already possessed.147 This is not to say that the 1983 amendments
were meaningless,148 but they certainly did not introduce the
concept of judicial discretion to the area of case management. 
The discretion provided in the current version of Rule 16 is also
entirely consistent with the original design of the Federal Rules,149
which contemplated case-based discretion exercised by judges from
their very inception.150 Roscoe Pound, whose 1906 speech at the
American Bar Association is often credited with triggering the
American procedural revolution,151 was a “lifelong proponent of ju-
dicial discretion.”152 Charles Clark, who served as the chief drafter
of the Rules thirty years later, felt similarly.153 Reflecting those
influences, the 1938 set of Federal Rules had an equitable orienta-
tion,154 and authorized the exercise of judicial discretion at several
147. A variety of factors contributed to this, from increasing caseload pressures to changes
in how and when cases were assigned to judges. For full accounts of the managerial judging
story, see generally E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The
New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Resnik,
Managerial Judges, supra note 144.
148. For a discussion of the actual changes wrought by the 1983 amendments, see Shapiro,
supra note 31, at 1984-87.
149. See Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The Disciplined
Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD CLARK 115-16 (Peninah
Petruck ed., 1991) [hereinafter Subrin, Charles E. Clark] (“[R]ecent procedural reforms that
grant judges additional power to shape and control litigation are consonant with Clark’s
outlook.”).
150. Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional
Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 201 (1997)
(noting that the original Federal Rules were “founded upon judicial discretion”).
151. Marcus, supra note 72, at 1575-76; Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
152. Marcus, supra note 72, at 1576; see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law,
supra note 22, at 944-48 (recounting Pound’s efforts to promote judicial discretion). 
153. See Subrin, Charles E. Clark, supra note 149, at 116 (“At the heart of Clark’s
procedural outlook was his support of non-defining (what we now call ‘open-textured’)
procedural rules; a corollary was his belief that judges should be granted broad discretion to
interpret those rules. Clark distrusted lawyers and trusted judges.”).
154. See Marcus, supra note 72, at 1563 (“[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... draw
their essence more from the relaxed and discretionary background of equity than the
confining orientation of the common law.”); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law,
supra note 22, at 922 (“The underlying philosophy of, and procedural choices embodied in, the
Federal Rules were almost universally drawn from equity rather than common law.”).
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points. For example, from the beginning, Rule 15 has instructed
judges to permit amendments to pleadings “when justice so re-
quires,”155 and Rule 42 has permitted—but not required—judges to
consolidate or sever issues for trial.156 Understood in this context,
the story of Rule 16—and of other areas of increased discretion in
federal procedural practice157—is one of adjustment rather than one
of invention. 
 Of course, adjustments can be meaningful, too, and many
academic commentators have complained that the recent trend has
been to increase discretion to undesirable levels.158 To the extent
155. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
156. FED. R. CIV. P. 42. Another example of the longstanding commitment to judicial
discretion in connection with the Federal Rules is Rule 1, which states that the Rules “should
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising
Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV.
1325, 1330 (1995).
157. In other contexts, the exercise of judicial discretion is arguably cabined by the
existence of specific factors that must be considered. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b), 23(b)(3).
See also Bone, supra note 140, at 1969. But in practice, factors impose a small to nonexistent
restraint on the exercise of discretion because they tend to be “very general and frequently
just repeat what any sensible judge would consider anyway.” Id. 
Another important chapter in the recent story of procedural discretion is Rule 11. The 1983
amendment to Rule 11 was designed to strengthen the Rule, and that was accomplished in
part by removing judicial discretion. Marcus, supra note 72, at 1595 & n.136 (noting that
“Rule 11 expressly mandates the imposition of sanctions once a violation is found” (quoting
Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 1986))). But the experiment with a “no
discretion rule” led to persistent criticism, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of
American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989), and lasted
only ten years. In 1993, the Rule was amended once more to restore judicial discretion to
impose sanctions. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the revisions would “render the Rule toothless”). 
But procedural discretion stories do not always end with increased discretion, and the
experience with local opt-outs under Rule 26(a)’s automatic disclosure provisions may provide
a counterexample. When introduced in 1993, Rule 26(a) permitted local courts to choose not
to require automatic disclosures, but in 2000, the Rule was amended to remove the discretion
to opt out, and was done so in order “to establish a nationally uniform practice.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2000); see also Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through
Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 915 (2002) (describing opposition to the 2000
amendments from federal judges).
158. See, e.g., Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the
Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493 (1997); Bone, supra note 140, at 1968-69;
Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing Complex Litigation
Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273, 277 (1991); Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on
Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 45 (1995) (“The
powers assumed by managerial judges, however, evade the important checks that the framers
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that procedural discretion has indeed been expanding, it may be
attributable to the increased involvement of judges in the rule-
making process.159 But a precise account of that trend is not
essential here. What is clear is that judicial discretion now has a
major role to play in procedure,160 and it was ever thus.161 
D. Inherent Authority
Beyond rules and standing orders, judges may also govern the
behavior of litigants and parties during the course of litigation
through the exercise of inherent authority. Inherent authority
describes “incidental actions that federal judges take without a
specific statutory grant as needed to exercise their primary ‘judicial
power’ of deciding cases.”162 As that description suggests, the source
of inherent authority is different from the more formal procedural
mechanisms discussed thus far, both of which can be traced to
statute.163 Despite the fact that neither statute nor rule directly
assumed would prevent judicial arbitrariness.”); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood
Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 631 (arguing procedural reform
has resulted in a “realignment of power”).
159. See Bone, supra note 140, at 1974 (“[J]udges have come to dominate membership on
the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in recent years and judges tend to favor broad
discretion.”); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules
of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 627 (1994) (using public choice analysis that assumes
that judges will seek to enhance their latitude as a way of serving their self-interest). But see
Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on Macey, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 648 (1994) (resisting the self-interest assumption).
160. See Stephen Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1998, at 229, 240 (“At virtually every stage of the process ... the Rules grant judges
enormous discretion in the conduct and resolution of disputes.”).
161. Marcus, supra note 72, at 1615 (“Taken in big picture terms, then, the Federal Rules
construct has survived, and the current gravitation toward increased discretion does not
threaten to dislodge it in a serious way.”); Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1994 (“The history of
Rule 16 ... suggests both the inevitability and the desirability of significant discretion in areas
such as pretrial management.”).
162. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 738 n.4 (2001); see also Daniel Meador, Inherent Judicial
Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (1995) (defining the
term as “the authority of a trial court ... to control and direct the conduct of civil litigation
without any express authorization in a constitution, statute, or written rule of court”). 
163. Local rules are authorized directly by 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2006) (“[A]ll courts
established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their
business.”). They are further authorized by Rule 83. Standing orders lack direct statutory
authority, but are authorized by Rule 83 and therefore may claim indirect statutory authority
452 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:415
authorizes it, the exercise of inherent power nevertheless has a long
judicial pedigree, justified “by general references to Article III,
traditional equitable or common law practices, efficiency, prudence,
or separation of powers.”164 
Although inherent authority operates outside of the formal rules,
it is not boundless, and its legitimate exercise is generally limited
to certain recognized areas. In the civil context, the most relevant
domain for inherent authority is the management of litigation and
control of case dispositions.165 But within that domain, the scope of
a court’s inherent authority is quite broad; judicial recognition of
authority to control litigation predates the introduction of the
Federal Rules,166 and the Rules have therefore been interpreted as
being written against the backdrop of inherent power.167 As a result,
courts have approved the use of inherent authority even in circum-
stances that appear to be inconsistent with the more formal
requirements of the Federal Rules. For example, the Supreme Court
cited inherent authority to approve a sua sponte dismissal of a case
for failure to prosecute, even though Rule 41 by its clear terms
through 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 28 U.S.C. § 2072; FED. R. CIV. P. 83. As discussed above, the power
to impose sanctions for violations of local rules and standing orders has been viewed by some
courts to stem from inherent authority rather than from the rules themselves. See infra text
accompanying note 172; see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 62 F. App’x 165, 165 (9th Cir. 2003)
(defining inherent authority as the source of power to sanction noncompliance with standing
orders).
164. See Pushaw, supra note 162, at 739, 760-82 (extensively reviewing and criticizing
these justifications).
165. This includes the related ability to impose sanctions for failure to comply with orders
designed to facilitate case management. See id. at 764-79. An unrelated area where inherent
authority has been regularly invoked—“supervising the administration of criminal justice”—is
not relevant for present purposes. Id. at 738, 779-82.
166. See, e.g., Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (recognizing “the power
inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants”).
167. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (“The authority of a court
to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent
power,’ governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”);
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)
(“[T]he inherent power of a district judge—derived from the very nature and existence of his
judicial office—is the broad field over which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applied.
Inherent authority remains the means by which district judges deal with circumstances not
proscribed or specifically addressed by rule or statute.”); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1985).
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refers only to dismissals upon motion by the defendant.168 More
recently, an en banc Seventh Circuit considered whether a district
judge can require a represented party to attend a settlement
conference.169 Rule 16(a) authorizes a judge to order “the attorneys
and any unrepresented parties to appear,”170 and the traditional
negative implication from that specification would suggest that
represented parties may not be compelled to attend. Even so, the
court approved the judge’s order, citing inherent authority to fill in
the “gap” left by the rule.171 
In sum, courts can issue orders and impose sanctions under the
guise of inherent authority, and the exercise is relatively unchecked.
From time to time, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
“inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls” and
has urged “restraint and discretion.”172 But in practice, efforts to
challenge the exercise of inherent powers are tricky, both because
parties may rightfully worry about provoking sanctions or judicial
ill will,173 and because challenges are reviewed on appeal under the
very forgiving “abuse of discretion” standard.174 Thus, at the ex-
treme, inherent authority permits the district judge to act as “a local
chancellor,”175 and the written rules—whether federal, local, or
standing orders—do not adequately define the body of procedures
168. Link, 370 U.S. at 629-32.
169. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 650.
170. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a).
171. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652-53. For a discussion—and criticism—of how courts
strategically create gaps in procedural rules to justify the use of inherent power, see Samuel
P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 311, 313-15
(2010). 
172. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). In the domain of sanctions,
courts have been somewhat more aggressive about monitoring the exercise of inherent
authority, and have generally required that a district judge make a finding of bad faith before
imposing sanctions on that basis. See, e.g., Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d
1109, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008); Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 338 (2d
Cir. 1999); Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1995); Ross v. City of Waukegan, 5 F.3d
1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 1993). But see Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175,
1180 (9th Cir. 2008); Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 433 (6th Cir. 2007).
173. Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 144, at 402, 413, 425, 430.
174. See Meador, supra note 162, at 1805, 1816; Pushaw, supra note 162, at 764.
Challenges may also be difficult for the additional reason that many exercises of inherent
authority may occur off the record, and may therefore be essentially unreviewable. See
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 144, at 411-13, 424-31. 
175. Carrington, supra note 96, at 943.
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applicable in a given case. Orders entered under the guise of the
court’s inherent authority are part of the overall procedural pack-
age, and variations in practice with respect to that authority also
contribute to procedural disuniformity across cases.
E. Procedural Common Law
A final form of procedural disuniformity stems from areas not
reached by the rules, but governed instead by procedural common
law. Examples here include preclusion, abstention, and forum non
conveniens. These relatively broad swaths of the procedural land-
scape have never been subject to formal rulemaking, but instead are
governed by judicially-created doctrines. In this at least, procedural
common law is similar to inherent authority.176 Indeed, Amy Coney
Barrett has suggested that the similarities between the two are
much greater and that inherent power may be viewed as a partial
source of the judicial authority to develop procedural common law.177
Even if there is some overlap in authority, it is useful to distinguish
procedural common law from the exercises of inherent power
discussed in Part III.D. The primary functional distinction between
the two is that procedural common law is subject to normal
doctrinal development. Courts understand that their role is to create
a prospective and generally applicable set of common law rules.178
Inherent power, by contrast, is often used to justify the imposition
of case-specific procedural requirements.179 
176. Inherent power and procedural common law are also similar in the sense that they
may be constrained—at least up to a point—by the introduction of formal rules or statutes.
See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 842-46 (2008).
177. Id. But she does not conclude that inherent power is the only source of that authority;
rather, “federal courts can exercise a common law authority over procedure analogous to their
common law authority over substance.” Id. at 883.
178. Bone, supra note 140, at 1967 n.17; Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG. 79, 111-14 (2006).
179. Put differently, the procedural requirements discussed in Part III.D are examples of
inherent power being used “in the weak sense.” Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and
Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1677, 1686 (2004) [hereinafter Burbank,
Procedure, Politics, and Power].
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IV. RETHINKING TRANS-TERRITORIALITY—AND REFRAMING LOCAL
RULES
Widening the lens on territorial variation ultimately leads to a
richer understanding of trans-territoriality as a procedural value,
and of the function of local rules within our procedural system.
Trans-territoriality may be an aspirational goal, but it is not one
that is realistically attainable. There will always be variations in
procedural requirements that are sensitive to location. Moreover,
the forms of territorial variation are numerous and overlapping,
such that the use of one can often substitute for another. All of this
suggests that the debate about local rules should be reframed. It is
not a question simply of whether to permit territorial variation in
any absolute sense, but whether to permit a certain form of
territorial variation. The answer to that question turns on whether
local rules have features that are desirable relative to other forms
of territorial variation that they may displace. 
A. Inevitability and Exchangeability
Trans-territoriality is achievable if it requires nothing more than
formal uniformity in the language of the written rules that are
applied throughout the federal system. Viewed this way, local rules
are problematic because they contribute to formal and explicit dif-
ferences in written rules. Of the competing forms of territorial
variation discussed in Part III, however, only standing orders raise
similar concerns.180 Interpretations and exercises of discretion occur
within the rules, but do not affect their formal language. Uses of
inherent power and the creation of procedural common law are even
less worrisome because they fall outside the domain of the written
rules altogether. Thus, local rules emerge as the primary—and
perhaps the only—deviation from the trans-territorial ideal, and the
argument for their elimination appears straightforward and com-
pelling: remove local rules, and the promise of trans-territoriality is
fulfilled.
180. And given the formalistic nature of this conception of trans-territoriality, even
standing orders might be distinguished from local rules on the grounds that only the latter
are denoted as “rules.” See supra Part III.A. 
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Unfortunately, this thin conception of trans-territoriality is
inconsistent with the ends that trans-territorial procedure is in-
tended to achieve.181 Most obviously, a focus on the language of
written rules serves only a very formalistic notion of equality. To
further a more robust interest in equality, a sufficient amount of
procedural consistency is required to ensure that similar cases are
treated equally.182 Superficial uniformity is therefore insufficient,
and the proper emphasis instead should be on the actual procedural
requirements that are imposed. Given that emphasis, any source of
territorial variation raises concerns. 
Formal uniformity also fails to meaningfully promote the nation-
alization of legal practice. A fixed set of rules means that lawyers
need only memorize one set of words and numbers, but it does not
put them in a position to enter a federal courtroom in an unfamiliar
district without having “to rely heavily on the wisdom of local prac-
titioners.”183 Again, a practicing lawyer is ultimately concerned with
the actual procedural requirements that may be imposed, which
requires more than a mere understanding of what the written rules
say. In short, the value of trans-territoriality suggests something
more than a formal uniformity of written rules. And given a more
robust conception, local rules look much less like an outlier. To the
contrary, each of the forms of variation discussed in Part III
represents a deviation from the trans-territorial ideal.184 
Of course, it should also be clear that trans-territoriality in this
robust sense will always be aspirational rather than actual. It is not
practical to create a procedural regime that imposes procedural
181. See supra Part I.B.
182. See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 22, at 982-85.
183. Shapiro, supra note 31, at 1974. 
184. To be sure, some of the forms discussed in Part III are not “territorial” in precisely the
same way as local rules. Local rules create procedural differences that apply throughout a
federal judicial district; thus, the relevant territory is defined along district lines. The
territorial divisions associated with competing forms are occasionally broader. For example,
when an appellate court has interpreted a rule in a particular way, the relevant territory is
demarcated by circuit lines. More often, the divisions are narrower. When an individual judge
chooses how to exercise procedural discretion, or whether to supplement the formal rules with
a procedural requirement justified by inherent power, the relevant territory is limited to the
individual courtroom. Despite these distinctions in the physical scope of the variation, each
of the forms discussed contributes to differences in procedural requirements that are
attributable to the location of the suit, and each therefore undermines the goal of uniformity
embodied by the value of trans-territoriality.
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requirements that are not sensitive to the location of the suit.
Rather, the creation of a set of procedural rules that applies across
the federal system will inevitably involve territorial variation in one
form or another. Local rules should therefore be viewed as one
potential component of an inevitable mix of territorial variation. So
situated, the question of whether they should be retained—and in
what role—becomes more complex. It is not enough simply to ask
whether local rules disrupt territorial uniformity, for at some level
of course they do. Instead, the appropriate question is whether a
procedural regime that permits local rules produces a better mix of
territorial variation than one that does not. 
Reframing the question in this way does not necessarily entail a
different conclusion. Even if trans-territoriality cannot be fully
achieved, it still might support an effort to root out deviations wher-
ever possible. Some competing forms—such as interpretation185 and
the exercise of inherent power186—may be impossible to eliminate,
but local rules may remain an attractive target that would reduce
the total amount of territorial variation in the procedural system.
What this misses, however, is that the forms of territorial variation
are interrelated and transposable, at least to some extent. That is,
the introduction of a local rule can often serve to displace a compet-
ing form of territorial variation. Many local rules define require-
ments that might otherwise be imposed through a standing order or
an exercise of inherent power, whereas others channel the exercise
of judicial discretion or fix meaning that might otherwise be selected
through interpretation. In short, local rules do not exist in a
vacuum, and their presence or absence will have ancillary effects on
the overall level and composition of territorial variation in the
procedural system.187 A proper understanding of their desirability
185. Even Professor Struve concedes that some judicial interpretation will necessarily
accompany the introduction and application of a set of procedural rules. See Struve, supra
note 139, at 1102.
186. Commentators and courts have long suggested that the legislative power to limit
inherent power is itself limited, although uncertainty remains about the precise scope of the
limitation. See, e.g., Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, supra note 179, at 1688.
187. Although local rules can substitute for other forms of territorial variation, they will
not always do so. Therefore, the availability of local rules as a form of territorial variation
may generate some overall increase in the level of disuniformity within the federal system.
But that does not necessarily mean that we should seek to eliminate local rules. Ultimately,
we should be concerned not just about the amount of territorial disuniformity, but also about
its quality. Consideration of the overall mix of territorial variation in a system that permits
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and function thus requires a consideration of the way that they
interact with—and compare to—competing forms of territorial
variation. Part IV.B engages in such a comparison, and concludes
that local rules have some significant advantages that should lead
to acceptance of, and perhaps even enthusiasm for their role in the
procedural framework.
B. A Comparative Assessment of Local Rules
When compared with competing forms of territorial variation,
local rules emerge as desirable along several dimensions. They are
transparent, which—contrary to common understanding—means
that they facilitate national practice. They involve significant levels
of participation and input from judges, as well as from nonjudicial
actors. And they apply uniformly throughout a judicial district and
across time, which promotes a desirable form of equal treatment
among cases. 
1. Transparency and Nationalization
Local rules are transparent in the sense that they are visible and
easily discoverable. This is not altogether surprising, given that
many of the recent amendments to Rule 83 have been designed
explicitly to facilitate those qualities. For example, the current
version of Rule 83(a)(1) requires district courts to “conform to any
uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial Conference of
the United States.”188 Thus, local rules now track the numbering of
the Federal Rules, which makes it easy for lawyers familiar with the
latter to locate counterparts in the former. This task is made even
simpler by the fact that local rules are now posted on court websites,
often in a searchable format.189 As a result, a lawyer interested in
local rules may lead us to tolerate the former to enhance the latter.
188. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). Prior to this requirement, district courts used a variety of
competing numbering systems for local rules, which made it difficult to find and compare local
rules. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., REPORT ON LOCAL RULES 17 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesandPolicies/rules/Final_Local_Rules_Report_March_%202004.pdf (listing districts not
in compliance with the Uniform Numbering System). 
189. In some districts, the court website includes a search function. See, e.g., United States
District Court: Northern District of Illinois, Local Rules, http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/
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discovering local rules relating to summary judgment in a particular
district can do so either by looking at Local Rule 56 or by performing
a basic search of the local rules. Local rules are also transparent in
the sense that they are defined in advance. They are promulgated
according to a set process,190 become enforceable on a set date, and
generally are not applied retroactively.191 This means that they, like
the Federal Rules themselves, represent a set of procedural
requirements that are not only discoverable, but discoverable prior
to any interaction with the court.192 
Most competing forms of territorial variation are relatively less
transparent. Standing orders basically track local rules in that they
are available on court websites and are predefined, but they need
not conform to any particular organizational structure, which at the
margins makes them more difficult to navigate.193 If the governing
LocalRules.aspx?rtab=localrule (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). In other districts, there is no
search function, but the rules are available as a downloadable document that can be searched.
See, e.g., United States District Court: District of Montana, Local Rules, http://www.mtd.
uscourts.gov/rules.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2010) (providing a downloadable PDF of the
court’s rules). 
190. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
191. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1) (“A local rule takes effect on the date specified by the district
court and remains in effect unless amended by the court or abrogated by the judicial council
of the circuit.”); see also Wash. Mobilization Comm. v. Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186, 190 n.2
(D.D.C. 1975) (finding that a local rule relating to requirements for class certification prom-
ulgated after the filing of the complaint would not apply retroactively to class certification
determination), rev’d in part on other grounds, 566 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Boring v.
Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 80 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (“Our local rules ... have no
retroactive effect.”).
192. Of course, there are downsides to predefinition. Relative to some other forms of
territorial variation such as discretion and inherent authority, local rules are more inflexible
precisely because they involve the predefinition of procedural requirements rather than the
development of requirements within the context of specific cases. So to the extent we prefer
specific and contextual requirements, we may prefer to eschew local rules in favor of those
other forms. Indeed, the choice to embed a discretionary standard within a generally
applicable federal rule may reflect a conclusion that contextual judgment is needed. This
suggests that we should not expect local rules to be capable of displacing other forms that
permit contextual decision making. But short of total displacement, there is still room for local
rules to eliminate or narrow discretion in some instances, such as when the selection of a
discretionary standard reflects a failure to reach a national consensus on a more fixed rule. 
193. Rule 83(b) specifies that standing orders may not be enforced absent “actual notice”
in advance to the alleged violator. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b). This requirement might be strictly
enforced to ensure that nonuniform numbering or organization will not disadvantage lawyers
and parties, but in practice the Internet publication of a judge’s standing orders in toto has
been viewed to satisfy the requirement of actual notice. See supra notes 119-21 and
accompanying text. 
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appellate court has interpreted a particular rule provision, then that
interpretation is like a local rule in the sense that it is discoverable
and knowable in advance, although the method of discovery takes
a different form. In the event that there is no binding interpretation
by the appellate court, the diligent lawyer’s next move would be to
research interpretations at the district court level, either by the
presiding judge or her colleagues. But these earlier interpretations
are merely predictive,194 and for that reason they are not dis-
coverable in the same manner as local rules and binding interpreta-
tions. Moreover, the task of compiling and reconciling competing
interpretations by multiple district judges is not nearly as straight-
forward as the identification of a governing local rule. Areas
governed by procedural common law function similarly to interpre-
tation: in the absence of a binding appellate decision, lawyers will
rely on uncertain predictions based on prior decisions at the district
court level. 
Areas governed by discretion and inherent authority are less
transparent still. Although the discretionary standard may be
knowable in advance, the way that any given judge will choose to
implement that discretion is much more difficult to ascertain.
Again, prior opinions may help, but their predictive value is
arguably weaker because of the context-specific nature of discretion-
ary decisions. A larger problem is that most exercises of discretion
will not find their way into a published opinion at all, and so the
informational cue provided by prior cases will be incomplete.195
Instead, the best predictive source with respect to discretion-based
194. This is true even of prior interpretations by the same district judge. A district judge
who has interpreted a rule in a particular way in a previous case may be likely to adopt the
same interpretation again, but that result is not compelled because traditional stare decisis
principles do not apply to district judges. Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process,
74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015, 1070 (2003); see also Midlock v. Apple Vacations W., Inc., 406
F.3d 453, 457-58 (7th Cir. 2005); Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366,
1371 (3d Cir. 1991).
195. This point applies in the interpretive context, too. Not all interpretations will be
reduced to a formal opinion, although perhaps actions based on interpretation are relatively
more likely to trigger a written explanation than those based on discretion. See Judge Diane
Wood, Remarks from Panel 2: Tools for Ensuring that Settlements Are “Fair, Reasonable, and
Adequate,” at the FTC Workshop on Protecting Consumer Interests in Class Actions (Sept.
13-14, 2004), in 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1197, 1213 (2005) (stating many opinions happen
“quietly in the chambers of the judges” and one will have “a distorted view of what’s going on
if you’re looking only at the published opinions”).
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procedural requirements is prior experience with the judge. Lawyers
seeking to know how the broad authority provided under Rule 16
will be exercised are likely to ask other lawyers who have experi-
ence practicing before the judge. As for inherent authority, because
it is used less frequently, and perhaps less predictably or consis-
tently, the available predictive information is even more limited.
Thus, while it is true that procedural requirements are transparent
inasmuch as they cannot generally be enforced without first being
made explicit, it is also true that lawyers and parties will be hard
pressed to know what those requirements might be at the outset of
the case. 
All of this turns one of the traditional arguments against local
rules on its head. Critics of local rules have long argued that local
rules discourage the nationalization of legal practice, and therefore
are in tension with one of the original goals of trans-territorial
procedure.196 The basis for that complaint is that nonlocal counsel
are burdened by the need to discover and master local rules. But
regardless of whether local rules are permitted, a lawyer must
familiarize herself with the local legal culture to practice effectively
in a new geographic district, or even in front of a new judge within
the same district. In practice, local rules may serve to level the
playing field by formalizing that local legal culture and presenting
it in a visible way. Put differently, if local rulemaking authority is
removed, territorial variation will not disappear, but will become
embedded in less visible forms, and the disadvantage presented to
the outsider will be exacerbated rather than relieved. 
2. Participation and Quality
Local rules also involve input from nonjudicial actors. Again, this
is the result of intentional changes to the local rulemaking process
that have been designed to enhance participation rights. To begin,
the current version of Rule 83 requires a period for notice and
comment before local rules are promulgated, which gives an avenue
for participation to anyone who might be affected by a proposed rule
change.197 Moreover, many recent developments in local rules have
196. For a discussion of the nationalization goal of trans-territoriality, see supra Part I.B.1.
197. FED. R. CIV. P. 83. This requirement is of fairly new vintage, and was introduced to
address concerns about the insulated nature of the local rulemaking process. See supra notes
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their roots in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which requires
the creation of an advisory committee that consists of a mix of
judges and others “who must live with the civil justice system on a
regular basis.”198 Taken together, these process reforms mean that
local rules now reflect the input of nonjudicial actors both at the
stage of initial drafting, and at the stage of postdrafting consider-
ation.
Admittedly, these participation rights remain weak. Nonjudicial
actors have no final role in the rulemaking process; the ultimate
decision about whether to adopt a local rule remains firmly in the
hands of the district judges themselves.199 In other words,
nonjudicial actors are granted a voice in the process but denied a
vote. Moreover, the rights that exist are imperfect. Although anyone
may participate in the notice and comment process, in practice the
voices raised are likely to be local. Consequently, the input gener-
ated may be skewed, and the resulting rules may favor local
interests.200 
But even if limited and imperfect, these participation rights
distinguish local rules from competing forms of territorial variation.
Standing orders, for example, involve no formal participation rights
other than the standard right to appeal.201 As for the remaining
forms of territorial variation, the ability of nonjudicial actors to
participate is generally limited to participation in the litigation pro-
cess itself. That is, a lawyer involved in a particular case may have
an opportunity to argue on behalf of her preferred interpretation, or
on behalf of her preferred exercise of discretion, and that argument
may contribute to the development of the procedural rules imposed
105-08 and accompanying text.
198. 136 CONG. REC. S101-108 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
199. And another potential form of participation in the process—appellate challenge of the
rules actually adopted—has been generally resisted by the appellate courts. See Flanders,
supra note 11, at 217-18 (describing the failure of appellate courts to monitor and enforce
statutory limitations on the proper scope of local rules). Even if appellate courts were more
aggressive, however, they would be authorized to act only when an adopted rule is
inconsistent with the rulemaking authority provided by Rule 83. In other words, the appellate
courts could not impose a competing local rule on the basis of preference alone.
200. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text. But of course, the presence of local
input, even if disproportionate to nonlocal input, does not guarantee that the resulting rules
will be skewed. 
201. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text (describing the process for
promulgating standing orders).
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in the case.202 But this case-specific participation is different in kind
from the ability to contribute to the development of generally
applicable rules that the local rulemaking process provides,
especially because the number of participants in that latter process
is potentially much greater and more diverse.
3. Scope and Equality
The scope of local rules differs from the scope of competing forms
of territorial variation in two respects. First, the territorial scope of
local rules is not the same as competing forms. Local rules apply
throughout a federal district. Standing orders, as well as exercises
of discretion and inherent power, operate more narrowly at the level
of the individual district judge. Rule interpretations may operate at
that level, too, although they can also be broader, as when the
Supreme Court or the appellate court has issued an interpretation.
The territorial scope of procedural common law may also range from
the district level to the national level, depending on the status of
doctrinal development. Second, the temporal scope of local rules is
not the same as competing forms. Once promulgated, local rules
apply prospectively to all cases, at least until amended. They share
this stability with standing orders, appellate interpretations, and
some procedural common law. But other competing forms are less
stable. Interpretations made by district judges are governed by the
law of the case principles, but do not have any precedential value
that extends beyond the judgment. Exercises of discretion and
inherent power are similar; a district judge may exercise discretion
to impose a procedural requirement in one case, and then decline to
impose that requirement in the next case, even if the two cases are
similar. 
These differences in scope have effects in terms of how similar
cases are treated. The notions of equality embedded in the design of
our procedural system demand that similar cases reach similar
outcomes, and this demand for equality is sensitive to both territory
and time. Because they apply to every case throughout a federal
district, local rules have the salutary effect of making the procedural
202. And even this form of participation is not guaranteed. A court need not ask for input
from lawyers before interpreting a rule or exercising rule-based discretion. 
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requirements imposed by judges within that district more consis-
tent. And because they are stable unless formally amended through
an established process, they also make those requirements more
consistent over time. In some circumstances, a different form of
territorial variation may better promote equality, but local rules
offer a mix of territorial and temporal consistency that is relatively
attractive. 
Of course, local rules do not serve the equality interest perfectly.
Variations in procedural requirements will undoubtedly remain
even in a regime that permits local rules, and variations in the
treatment of similar cases may therefore result. But because these
variations track district lines, they may be more acceptable than
other variations that appear much more random. Put differently,
differences in outcomes based on the district where the case is filed
may be less damaging to our intuitions of fairness than differences
in outcomes based on the judge within a district to whom a case is
assigned. 
CONCLUSION 
The essence of the traditional complaint about local rules is that
they create geographic variations in the federal system, and that
those variations undermine the procedural value of trans-
territoriality. Procedural uniformity is good; local rules disrupt
uniformity; therefore, local rules must go. This argument is facially
attractive, but ultimately unconvincing. It views local rules as an
outlier, as an obstacle to the fulfillment of an ideal. But in practice,
territorial variations in procedural requirements are common and
inevitable, and the sources of those variations are numerous and
transposable. If we broaden the lens on territorial variation, the
debate about local rules looks much different. The choice is not
between two procedural systems, one with territorial variation and
one without. It is between two profiles of territorial variation, one
that includes local rules and one that does not. 
